A federal case is not won on institutional weight or discovery leverage. It is won or lost based on arguments. And I fail to see what argument the US DoJ can make that another plaintiff can't make (or hasn't already made).
Please explain how "weight" would influence the analysis the judge (or judges) would do. And how "discovery" helps in a civil rights case that is not based on elucidating facts, but on legal theories.
Certainly, having really good attorneys can help the cause. There is a good reason that Gura, Clement and Murphy are famous. None of them work for the US DoJ, and never will.
And political cost doesn't help at all in court. Sure, the federal government would win brownie points with people who are pro-gun. Which mostly means with red states, in particular with MAGA voters. It would lose brownie points with anti-gun / democratic / California voters. But to do that, no actual lawsuit is required, just grandstanding.
The whole thing is propaganda.
If that merit were enough to win, you or I could file the suit. With a few hundred thousand $, we could even hire some good lawyers to do so with the correct formatting and line spacing, and making fancy sounding arguments. Organizations like the SAF, FPC, CRPA and so on do this kind of stuff all the time. Some of these suits are already in the pipeline; others have already been rejected. The federal DoJ really doesn't have a magic wand to create new merits.
By the way, some of your arguments might have merit. There have been cases where California gun control laws were overturned by courts. I remind you of Nordyke as the prime example: it really created the argument that the 2A is incorporated, before McDonald picked it up from the mooted wreckage.
The "so" just means: nothing will come of this that isn't already coming down the pipeline.
I don’t disagree with the narrow point that DOJ does not get a magic merits wand. A federal case is ultimately won or lost on the law, the record, the procedural posture, and the quality of the briefing. If the argument is bad, the caption “United States v. California” does not save it.
But I think you are overstating the opposite point.
When I say DOJ brings institutional weight, I do not mean the judge is supposed to defer to DOJ because it is DOJ. I mean the case posture is materially different. The United States as plaintiff can affect standing, remedial scope, enforcement posture, settlement pressure, appellate handling, and the practical cost to the state. That is not the same thing as saying DOJ automatically wins.
Same with discovery. I agree that a pure facial Second Amendment challenge is mostly legal. But not every gun case is purely abstract. California is defending this law on factual predicates about conversion devices, public safety, technological feasibility, enforcement problems, and the supposed relationship between lawful handguns and criminal misuse. If the state relies on those factual premises, discovery and record development can matter. Maybe not as much as in a police-misconduct case, but it is not categorically irrelevant.
I also agree that Clement, Gura, Murphy, etc. are better-known appellate 2A names than current DOJ lawyers. No argument there. The private 2A organizations have done most of the trench work and will probably continue doing most of it.
But “DOJ does not create new merits” is different from “DOJ involvement means nothing.” If the United States sues California over a Second Amendment/civil-rights issue, that changes the litigation environment even if it does not change the Bruen analysis itself.
The actual merits are still the central issue: California is targeting a broad category of common semiautomatic handguns because criminals may illegally modify some of them. That seems vulnerable under Heller/Bruen/common-use analysis. Could SAF/FPC/CRPA make that same argument? Yes. Have private plaintiffs been making similar arguments? Yes. Does that make a federal enforcement action worthless? No.
So I agree with your limited point: DOJ does not have a magic wand, and nobody should celebrate until a complaint is filed and litigated.
But I disagree with the broader “so what” conclusion. Same legal theory does not always mean same litigation posture. A private plaintiff, a gun-rights organization, and the United States can all raise overlapping arguments while still creating different pressure, different remedies, and different strategic consequences.
A lawsuit filed by
the United States is not the same practical animal as a lawsuit filed by “John Smith” or even a gun-rights nonprofit.
“Standing” means DOJ may be able to frame the injury differently. A private plaintiff usually has to show, “This law injures me personally.” An organization has to show injury to its members or its operations. The United States can sometimes sue based on enforcing federal constitutional rights or federal statutory authority. That can avoid some plaintiff-specific problems.
“Remedial scope” means what the court can order. A private plaintiff may get relief tied to that plaintiff or that case. DOJ is more naturally positioned to seek broader relief against a state policy or enforcement scheme.
“Enforcement posture” means California has to treat the case differently when the plaintiff is the federal government. It is not just some guy or one nonprofit. It is the United States alleging that California is violating federal constitutional rights.
“Settlement pressure” means the state may be more likely to negotiate, modify enforcement, delay implementation, or narrow the law when DOJ is involved. Not because DOJ is legally magic, but because fighting the federal government has larger cost, publicity, and risk.
“Appellate handling” means if the case goes up, the United States has institutional appellate resources and can coordinate strategy across related cases. It can also file related statements of interest, amicus briefs, or intervene in ways private parties cannot always do.
“Practical cost to the state” means California has to spend more time, money, and political capital defending the law. It also risks a federal court order in a case captioned
United States v. California, which is politically worse than losing to one private plaintiff.