Interesting discussions, above.
A few thoughts:
TL;DR: Wolford impacts May/Carralero (SB2, CCW) [see:
https://michellawyers.com/wp-conten...6-Order-Consolidating-Cases-May-Carralero.pdf ] but doesn’t impact Duncan.
First, Wolford reached only the default rule for public-facing businesses.
Hawaii’s law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner’s express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
See Syllabus, page 3, HELD at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1046_nmio.pdf
Hawai‘i’s law still stands for private property that isn’t generally open to the public and the decision doesn’t touch sensitive places like schools or polling places, where the Supreme Court has already made clear that it’s okay to ban guns.
This doesn’t appear to impact Duncan in any way. The impact will affect May/Carralero v Bonta, the lawsuit against SB 2 in California which has been held at the 9CA pending Wolford. With settling of Wolford, parties have 14 days to submit a status report to 9CA.
See:
https://michellawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/2025-10-14-Order-Granting-Stay.pdf
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Second, and perhaps more important, Wolford provided no new guidance on the first question of Bruen:
Does the Second Amendment’s plain text cover the regulated conduct? The Court simply found that,
As with any Second Amendment challenge, we began by asking whether the restrictions imposed by the challenged law fall within the plain text of the Second Amendment, see Bruen, 597 U. S., at 17, and we find that this requirement is easily met. No party disputes that petitioners are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment or that they seek to “bear,” i.e., to carry, “arms.” Therefore, “the plain text of the Second Amendment protects” what petitioners want to do: carry handguns for self-defense.
See Opinion, Pg 13, Section IV, A, Para 1&2:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1046_nmio.pdf
Once the first question is answered (does the plain text protect?) the government is tasked with proving how historical legal actions in this area support the challenged statute through similar or analogous laws during the Founding of the country.
In Duncan, the first question is still unresolved.
In Duncan, the 9 CA asserts that:
First, the text of the Second Amendment does not encompass the right to possess large-capacity magazines because large-capacity magazines are neither “arms” nor protected accessories.
See Pg. 3, Paras 2&3 at:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/20/23-55805.pdf
Opposing briefs disagree, Page 2 @: (
https://michellawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2025-11-05-Petitioners-Reply-Brief.pdf )
The D.C. and Third Circuits have held that magazines fit squarely within the Second Amendment’s plain text, no matter whether they hold two rounds or 20. The First Circuit has assumed the same. But the Ninth and Seventh Circuits (plus Washington’s Supreme Court) have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that some or all magazines are not covered by the plain text at all.
Citations omitted.
So, the question is unsettled and must be resolved by SCOTUS since Wolford does no work to settle this in Duncan. That appears to make remanding to lower courts for review of the first question unlikely.
9CA continued (same citation):
Second, even assuming that the text of the Second Amendment encompasses the possession of optional accessories like large-capacity magazines, California’s ban on large-capacity magazines falls within the Nation’s tradition of protecting innocent persons by prohibiting especially dangerous uses of weapons and by regulating components necessary to the firing of a firearm.
But we only get to the second question if the first question is affirmative for falling under the protection of the plain text of the Second Amendment. Because the first question hasn’t been answered, the Wolford discussion of historical analogs seems irrelevant to Duncan and doesn’t appear to provide grounds for remand.